Contracts—Effect of Merger Clause on Fraud by Agent by Sorenson, Philip C.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 2 Article 8
1957
Contracts—Effect of Merger Clause on Fraud by
Agent
Philip C. Sorenson
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Philip C. Sorenson, Contracts—Effect of Merger Clause on Fraud by Agent, 36 Neb. L. Rev. 360 (1957)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol36/iss2/8
360 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 
Contracts-Effect of Merger Clause on 
Fraud by Agent 
Action for purchase price of furnace which defendant had con-
tracted to buy. Petitioner's agent had induced defendant to enter 
into a contract which was subject to acceptance by the home office 
and which contract contained a merger clause.1 Buyer, in his answer, 
alleged fraudulent statements made by agent concerning the con-
dition of buyer's old furnace. On appeal Held: Plaintiff's motion 
for judgment on the pleadings sustained in that answer did not set 
up a defense to the petition since defendant was precluded from 
repudiating the merger clause.2 
The same court, in a decision handed down the same day, held 
tract by fraudulent material misrepresentations of an agent.3 Thus, 
the court, in the present case, recognized the power of the merger 
clause to prevent actions of rescission or defenses based on fraud 
of an agent. 
The merger clause involved in the subject case extended only to 
understandings, agreements, and warranties. Other clauses are 
broader, encompassing representations and inducements.4 The 
courts of this country have given varying effect to these clauses as 
a result of differing interpretations and not due to the substantive 
differences in the provisions of the clauses. A minority of courts, 
as in the principal case here, have held the clause prevents any 
action or defense based on any representations or agreements not 
in the written contract.5 Other courts have held that the clause is 
no more than a stipulation of the parol evidence rule,6 and have 
treated the defenses in light of that rule only. The majority of 
courts have felt that to give full effect to the clause is too harsh, but 
have afforded some consequence to it. Distinctions have been drawn 
1 "This Contract Contains the Entire Agreement Between the Parties. 
Verbal Understandings and Agreements with Representatives Shall Not Bind 
the Seller Unless Set Forth Herein. There are No Warranties, Express or 
Implied, Other Than Those Herein Stated." 
2 Holland Furnace Co. v. Williams, 179 Kan. 321, 295 P.2d 672 (1956). 
3 George v. Kohlasch, 179 Kan. 337, 295 P.2d 655 (1956). 
4 "It is understood and agreed that this contract contains all the covenants 
... ; that the same [property] is and has been purchased by the purchaser 
as a result of said inspection and not upon representations made by . . . 
selling agent . . . and the sellers will not be responsible for or liable on 
account of any inducements, promises, representation, or agreements not 
set forth herein." Speck v. Wylie, 1 Cal.2d 625, 36 P.2d 618 (1934). 
° Colt Co. v. Odom, 136 Miss. 651, 101 So. 853 (1924); see Annot., 75 
A.L.R. 1046 (1931), 133 A.L.R. 1349 (1941); notes 22 Corn. L.Q. 102 (1936-
37), 35 Ia. L. Rev. 105 (1949). 
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between fraud as to the terms of the contract and fraud in the 
inducement, 7 evidence being held inadmissable as to the former and 
admissable as to the latter. Another view holds that the clause re-
lieves the principal of liability for deceit, but permits the buyer 
the option to revoke.8 A situation similar to the principal case has 
not arisen in Nebraska, but it has been held that the merger clause 
gives notice of the scope of the authority of the agent and evidence 
showing fraud within that scope has been held admissable.9 
The variety of holdings have resulted from a variety of valid 
policy reasons. But an examination of these reasons reveals that 
they are not contradictory. 
A consideration of the principal's purpose in using the merger 
clause throws light on the problem and offers a possible solution. 
The purpose may be considered two-fold; (1) to ascertain the obli-
gation and to limit the agent in adding to or varying such, and (2) 
to protect the principal from unauthorized acts of his agents. The 
first purpose is met by the parol evidence rule, but in addition the 
clause shows the intent of the parties to integrate their agreements 
in writing and gives notice of the agent's lack of authority to add 
to or vary a proposed contract.10 The second can be met without 
loss to the buyer by permitting to him the option to revoke while 
relieving the principal of liability for deceit.11 The principal should 
be allowed to protect himself against unauthorized acts, yet he 
should not be allowed to benefit from them.12 
This above interpretation provides a warning to the buyer of 
the limited authority of the agent and the limited obligation of 
the principal. To refuse recission would allow a multitude of frauds 
to be protected by some exculpatory clause. In the principal case, 
6 Johns-Manvill Corp. v. Heckart, 129 Or. 505, 277 P. 821 (1921); see Vold, 
Sales, § 151 (1931); 9 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2439 (3d ed. 1940); 3 Williston, 
Contracts, § 811-A (Rev. ed. 1936). 
7 Rock Island Implement Co. v. Wally, 268 S.W. 904 (Mo. App. 1925); 
Plate v. Detroit Fidelity & S. Co., 229 Mich 482, 201 N.W. 457 (1924); Cf. 
Colonial Development Corp. v. Bragdon, 219 Mass. 170, 106 N.E. 633 (1914); 
see Annot., 127 A.L.R. 132 (1940), 133 A.L.R. 1349 (1941). 
s Speck v. Wylie, note 4, supra; Chapin v. Kreps, 106 N.J.L. 424, 147 
Atl. 398 (1929). See Annot., 95 A.L.R. 760 (1935), 127 A.L.R. 132 (1940). 
But see, Hall v. Crow, 240 Ia. 81 34 N.W.2d 195 (1948) allowing damages; 
Annot., 127 A.L.R. 143 (1940). 
9 Schuster v. North American Hotel Co., 106 Neb. 672, 186 N.W. 87 (1921). 
10 3 Williston, Contracts, § 811-A (Rev. ed. 1936); and see Schuster v. 
North. American Hotel Co., 106 Neb. 672, 186 N.W. 87 (1921). 
11 Restatement, Agency, § 260 (1), (2) (1933); and see cases note 8. 
12 J.I. Case Co. v. Bird, 51 Idaho 725, 11 P2d 966 ( 1932). 
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the clause did not restrict representations, but only "Understand-
ings and Agreements." Thus, the alleged fraudulent representa-
tions of the agent should not have been protected by the stated 
clause, and recission should have been permitted. 
Philip C. Sorensen, '59 
